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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, insurance law has dramatically shifted
from pro-insured to pro-insurer with respect to stipulated judgments.
The time period from the 1950s through the mid-1980s marked the gold-
en-age of plaintiff-oriented insurance litigation during which the courts
almost uniformly protected the interests of the insured at the expense
of the insurer. During that time, a tort claimant and the insured
tortfeasor would enter into a stipulated judgment. The insured would
assign his insurance rights to the tort claimant in exchange for a cove-
nant not to execute against the insured's uninsured assets. The tort-
claimant could then seek to enforce the stipulated judgment against the
insured's insurance carrier using the stipulated judgment as a sword
against a non-performing insurer.
Over the last several years, however, California courts have chipped
away at this concept, sub-issue by sub-issue. In several recent deci-
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topics for CEB, the Risk and Insurance Management Society of America and the
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sions,' the California Court of Appeal rejected attempts to enforce stip-
ulated judgments against insurers, viewing the judgments as almost
collusive per se. As such, they were unenforceable under any circum-
stances. Even with this change in attitude toward stipulated judgments,
courts will still enforce them where the evidence shows no risk of col-
lusion.2
This Article examines current California case law and addresses the
viability of stipulated judgments in light of this recent trend. Section II
provides a historical perspective of cases through which the enforce-
ability of stipulated judgments against non-performing insurers devel-
oped.3 Section III discusses the most recent cases which have ad-
dressed stipulated judgments and the various insurance provisions
which affect the viability of enforcing a stipulated judgment.' Section
IV examines the effect an insurer's breach will have on enforcement of
a stipulated judgment.' Section V suggests to the practitioner how to
fashion an enforceable stipulated judgment.6
I. HIsToRicAL PERSPECTVE
Historically, an assignment of rights by an insured to a third party
tort claimant was viewed as a powerful and necessary tool to facilitate
recovery against an insurer who refused to defend its insured. Although
most of the early cases involving the assignment of rights and subse-
1. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. National Fire Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 571 (Ct.
App. 1994) (contending that a stipulated judgment combined with a covenant not to
execute absolutely protects the insured against liability, therefore, providing no incen-
tive to contest liability or damages); Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire
Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 768 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the record supported
the trial court's conclusion that a stipulated judgment in exchange for a covenant not
to execute does not have collateral estoppel effect against the insurer); Wright v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588, 603 (CL App. 1992) (explaining that
there is a potential for collusion when a stipulated judgment under which the insured
has no personal liability binds the insurer); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 131, 137 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a stipulated judgment which does not
represent a "recovery against" the insured will not bind the insurer); Rose v. Royal
Ins. Co. of Am., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 486 (Ct. App. 1991) (acknowledging that a set-
tiement agreement between the insured and the injured party does not protect the in-
surer against collusion).
2. See Sanchez v. Truck Ins. Exch., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812, 815 (Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that an insurer cannot rely on a "no-action" clause and "refuse to defend its
insured .. . where a stipulated judgment was obtained against the insured in good
faith").
3. See infra notes 7-38 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 39-206 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 207-52 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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quent enforcement of a judgment against an insurer did not actually
involve stipulated judgments, they are often cited as support for the
enforcement of stipulated judgments. In the past, an insured's liability
could only be enforced against an insurer if a default judgment had
been entered or if an uncontested proceeding had been held.7 When the
insurer breached its primary duties, an insured could "settle with the
plaintiff upon the best terms possible, taking a covenant not to exe-
cute."8 Indeed, to demonstrate collusion on the part of the insured,
courts often required the insurer to plead, and prove with specificity,
that the plaintiff "had no substantial claim or chance of recovery and
that the parties had permitted a judgment [in the victim's] favor which
was disproportionate to his injuries.. .. "'
In Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group," the court stated, "[w]hen the
injured person takes over the policyholder's cause of action against the
insurer, actual or only potential, he arms himself with a weapon of
great strength."" In ritz, the plaintiff suffered severe iruuries as a
result of the defendant insured's negligence. 2 Although the insured had
a policy limit of $10,000, the insurance carrier offered the plaintiff only
$8250." Subsequently, the plaintiff secured an assignment of rights for
7. In Samson v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 636 P.2d 32 (Cal. 1981), the court
held the insurer liable for damages in excess of its policy limits when it wrongfully
rejected a settlement offer and refused to defend its insured. Id. at 46. The claimant
established the amount of damage by an uncontested presentation to the trial court
on the "short cause" calendar. Id. at 37. Similarly, in Zander v. Texaco, Inc., 66 Cal.
Rptr. 561 (Ct. App. 1968), the court approved a settlement agreement and an assign-
ment of rights where, following settlement, the insured allowed a default judgment to
be issued against him. Id. 567-69. Likewise, in Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group, 41
Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1964), because the insurer presented virtually no defense in
the underlying action, a fully contested trial on the merits did not take place. Id. at
403.
8. Samson, 636 P.2d at 45 (quoting Zander, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 568); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Paynter, 593 P.2d 948, 951-52 (Ariz. 1979) (citing cases in
which the court allowed the insurer to attack a stipulated judgment against its in-
sured when the evidence showed collusion).
9. Zander, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 570,
10. 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct. App. 1964).
11. Id. at 408. The Critz opinion recognized two prevailing public policy consider-
ations: First, "the public interest in encouraging settlements," and second, "fairness,
that is, equalization of the contenders' strategic advantages." Id.
12. Id. at 402. At the time of the accident, defendant was driving on the opposite
side of the road. Id.
13. Id. at 403.
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the insured's cause of action for bad faith refusal to settle.'4 In ex-
change, the insured received a covenant exempting him from any liabili-
ty in any subsequent judgment.'" The plaintiff then secured a judgment
in excess of the insured's policy limits and filed an action against the
insurer. 6 On appeal, the court held that the assignment of the
insured's cause of action for bad faith against the insurer did not vio-
late public policy, even though the assignment occurred prior to a de-
termination of liability against the insured."
In Samson v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,'8 the California Supreme
Court confronted a similar scenario in which an insurer breached its
duties to defend and to accept a reasonable settlement offer within its
policy limits."' In Samson, the court addressed whether an insurer
must satisfy a judgment entered against the insured even though the
insurer was not a party to the action which gave rise to the judgment."
The underlying action involved an automobile accident.' The in-
sured had two insurance policies: one with State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Company (State Farm) for $100,000, and the other with
Transamerica Insurance Company (Transamerica) for $300,000.' State
Farm agreed to assume the defense in the ensuing civil action while
Transamerica denied coverage under its policy.'
Prior to trial, the plaintiffs, the insured, and State Farm entered into
a settlement agreement whereby State Farm paid its policy limit and the
insured assigned his cause of action against Transamerica for a "cove-
nant not to execute."' The court tried the case on the "short cause
calendar" where the plaintiffs submitted the evidence of the insured's
criminal conviction.' The plaintiffs presented evidence regarding the
amount of damages.' The insured presented no defense and declined
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 409.
18. 636 P.2d 32 (Cal. 1981).
19. Id. at 34-35.
20. Id. at 34.
21. Id. at 35. The collision occurred because the insured was driving on the
"wrong side of the road." Id. The insured pled guilty to vehicular manslaughter. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 36-37.
24. Id. at 37.
25. Id.
26. Id. The amount of damages included the extent of plaintiffs' injuries and the
"value of the loss of the services of Mrs. Samson." Id.
1020
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to cross-examine adverse witnesses.27 The court awarded the plaintiffs
$725,000 in damages.'
The plaintiffs offered to settle the $625,000 balance of their claim
with Transamerica for the $300,000 policy limit, but Transamerica did
not respond.' Relying upon the assignment of rights from the insured,
the plaintiffs sued Transamerica for bad faith and obtained a summary
judgment award of $625,000.'
On appeal, Transamerica argued that the court should set aside the
judgment because the parties engaged in collusion and "'set up' the
excess policy judgment against it" in bad faith.3 The court concluded
that there was no evidence of collusion or bad faith.' The court stated
that "[w]hen the insurer 'exposes its policyholder to the sharp thrust of
personal liability' by breaching its obligations, the insured 'need not
indulge in financial masochism. .. .'"' Moreover, the court found that,
"'[b]y executing the assignment, [the insured] attempt[ed] only to shield
himself from the danger to which the company... exposed him.'"'
The court concluded that Transamerica was bound to the full judgment
against its insured.' In doing so, the court relied on the well estab-
lished rule that "an insurer that wrongfully refuses to defend is liable
on the judgment against the insured"' and the equally well established
rule that an insurer that rejects a reasonable settlement offer within
policy limits must also pay the overlimits portion of the judgment.'
As illustrated by Critz and Samson, California courts considered an
assignment of rights following a default judgment or settlement agree-
ment a legitimate means of protecting the insured from personal liabili-
ty. By contrast, the more recent cases view assignments of rights based
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id, at 37.
30. Id. at 37-38.
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id. (quoting Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 408 (Ct. App.
1964)).
34. Id
35. Id. at 46.
36. Id. at 42 (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 179 (Cal. 1966)).
37. Id. (citing Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d
744, 746 (Cal. 1975)).
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solely upon a stipulated judgment between the insured and the tort
claimant as collusive per se and unenforceable against the insurer.'
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS PERTAINING TO THE ENFORCEMENT
OF STIPULATED JUDGMENTS
A. Insurer Must Have the Opportunity to Participate in Settlement
Negotiations to Overcome the Presumption of Collusion
In Wright v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.,' the court observed
the potential for "abuse and collusion" when the insured and a third
party tort claimant enter into a stipulated judgment that is not based
upon a contested trial proceeding.' In Wright, the insured pled guilty
to felony drunk driving that resulted in a head-on collision with the
plaintiffs.4 Prior to trial, the insured's personal counsel negotiated a
settlement agreement with the plaintiffs in exchange for a covenant not
to execute against the insured.42 Counsel for the insurer did not partici-
pate in the settlement negotiations but was present at the hearing when
the stipulated judgment was read into the record.'
Subsequently, the plaintiffs proceeded to litigate the issue of insur-
ance coverage." The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs, concluding that the identified policies insured the defen-
dant. 5 The trial court then entered judgment against the insurer in the
amount of the stipulated judgment."
On appeal, the court addressed whether the stipulated judgment was
sufficient to bind the insurer.47 The court opined that while a party
must obtain a final judgment against the insured before suing an insurer
directly,' the party does not always need to obtain a judgment on the
merits.49 The court recognized that default and stipulated judgments
38. See infra notes 207-52 and accompanying text.
39. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558 (Ct. App. 1992).
40. Id. at 603. The court stated, "[wle are frankly disturbed by the potential for
abuse apparent in a situation where an insurer, in the absence of a breach of its
duty to its insured, could be bound by a consent judgment of this nature." Id. at
600.
41. Id. at 589. The collision injured the plaintiff and killed the plaintiffs passenger.
Id.
42. Id. at 590.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 592-93.
46. Id. at 594.
47. Id. at 595-604.
48. Id. at 598 (citing Chamberlin v. City of Los Angeles, 206 P.2d 661 (Ct. App.
1949)).
49. Id. (citing Samson v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 636 P.2d 32 (Cal. 1981); Clemmer
1022
[Vol. 22: 1017, 1995] Insurance Law
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
have bound insurers.' The court further noted that a settlement agree-
ment between the insured and a tort claimant binds the insured even
where the agreement contains a covenant not to execute against the
insured.5' The court stated that its judgment was "based upon the prin-
ciple that an insurer who has an opportunity to defend and wrongfully
fails to do so is liable on the judgment against the insured. "'
However, the court recognized the potential for fraud and collusion
in the situation in which an insured, who has no incentive to contest
liability or damages, attempts to bind its insurer through a settlement
agreement.' On that basis, the court ruled that
where an insurer provided a defense to its insured in the underlying litigation, and
the insured, without the participation or consent of the insurer, stipulated to a
judgment without evidentiary support and with no potential for personal loss,
such judgment is insufficient to impose liability on the insurer in a later ac-
tion ....
The court concluded that "[tlo hold otherwise would create in the in-
sured the ability to escape all liability for his or her own wrongdoing
while imposing on the insurer totally unsupported liability."'
B. A Final Determination of Liability is a Prerequisite to
Enforcement of a Stipulated Judgment
One area which often causes confusion for practioners and the court is
the distinction between enforcment of a stipulated judgment against an
insurer and a bad faith action against an insurer based upon a stipulated
judgment. Often, a third party plaintiff brings a bad faith action against
the insurer after entering into a stipulated judgment with the insured.
v. Hartford Ins. Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978); Zander v. Texaco, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr.
561 (Ct. App. 1968)).
150. Id. (citing Samson, 636 P.2d at 32, 42-46); Clemmer, 587 P.2d at 1108-09;
Zander, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 568-70).
51. Id. at 599 (citing Samson, 636 P.2d at 45; Johansen v. California State Auto.
Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744 (Cal. 1975); Zander, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 568; Critz
v. Farmers Ins. Group, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401, 408-09 (Ct. App. 1964)).
52. Id. at 600 (citing Samson, 636 P.2d at 42; Clemmer, 587 P.2d at 1108; Zander,
66 Cal. Rptr. at 567).
.53. Wright, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603-04.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 604.
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This situation is distinctly different from an enforcement action, and
accordingly, different legal principles apply.'
In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 7 the court
held that an insured cannot assign his rights against the insurer to a third
party unless either a court has made a final determination of the
insured's liability or the insured has personally paid part of the settle-
ment.' In Smith, the insured struck and killed the plaintiffs' son in an
automobile accident.' Subsequently, the plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death action against the insured.'
Before the case went to trial, the plaintiffs, the insured, and one of its
insurers, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, reached a settlement
which included a stipulated judgment in the amount of $500,000.1 Pur-
suant to the stipulated judgment, the insured assigned to the plaintiffs
"all claims that he might have against State Farm for its failure to defend
or settle the wrongful death action."' The plaintiffs promised the in-
sured that they would not execute the stipulated judgment against him as
consideration for the assignment.' Fireman's Fund partially satisfied the
judgment by paying its policy limits.' Plaintiffs then sued State Farm for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based upon
State Farm's failure to defend its insured.'
The Smith court acknowledged the well established rule that
[iif an insurer 'erroneously denies coverage and/or improperly refuses to defend
the insured' in violation of its contractual duties, 'the insured is entitled to make a
reasonable settlement of the claim in good faith and may then maintain an action
against the insurer to recover the amount of the settlement."'
The court recognized that an "insured may assign to the claimant his
cause of action against the insurer for breach of the implied cove-
nant .... 9 7
56. See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58, 69-70 (Cal. 1988)
(holding that "there must be a conclusive judicial determination of insured's liability"
and that "settlement is . . . insufficient").
57. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Ct. App. 1992).
58. Id. at 137.
59. Id. at 133.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 134.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 135 (quoting Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 750 P.2d 297
(Cal. 1988) (citations omitted)).
67. Id. (citing Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 553 P.2d 584, 587 (Cal. 1976) (citations
omitted)). As a limited exception to this rule, the court noted that an insured cannot
assign claims for punitive damages or emotional distress. Id.
1024
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In light of these principles, the Smith court addressed two separate
issues. First, the court determined whether "a judgment against the in-
sured [is] a necessary condition to its power to assign a cause of action
for bad faith against the insurer."' The court ruled that an insurer may
assign his rights only after a judgment against the insured has been en-
tered.' The court indicated that its ruling was in accordance with Cali-
fornia Evidence Code section 1155 which prohibits the admission of evi-
dence as to insurance coverage in personal injury actions," ensures that
the insured's liability is determined on the merits,7' and avoids placing
"excess insurers at an unfair disadvantage."'
Second, the court addressed whether a stipulated judgment with a
covenant not to execute suffices as the requisite "judgment."' The court
ruled that a stipulated judgment with a covenant not to execute is not a
"judgment against the insured" because it does not impose liability
against the insured. The court explained that "[a] stipulated judgment
with a covenant not to execute will not bind the insurer under Civil Code
section 2778, subdivision 5, because it does not represent a 'recovery
against' the insured ... ."7 The statute refers to a recovery which im-
poses liability, whereas a "covenant not to execute shields the insured
from such liability."7' Accordingly, the court stated that an insurer
would not be bound by a stipulated judgment which contains a covenant
not to execute because it does not represent a recovery against the in-
68. Id. at 136.
69. Id. at 137 (discussing Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n, 750 P.2d 297
(Cal. 1988) (holding that an insured who contributed to a settlement could sue its in-
surer before entry of a final judgment); Continental Casualty Co. v. Royal Ins. Co.,
268 Cal. Rptr. 193 (Ct. App. 1990) (permitting an excess insurer to sue primary insur-
er for bad faith refusal to settle).
70. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136; see CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155 (West 1993).
71. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. The court noted that an assignment of a tort
claim for damage to property does not "compromise the adjudication of liability to
the same extent because it does not remove the tortfeasor as a party to the litiga-
tion." Id.
72. Id. at 137. The court stated that "[i]f such assignments were allowed without
restriction, the excess insurer would often face either a second round of litigation or
the necessity of filing a cross-complaint for declaratory relief in the original action."
Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 137-38.
75. Id. at 137; see CAL CIV. CODE § 2778(5) (West 1993) (stating that a settlement
between the insured and the injured claimant is presumptive evidence of the
insured's liability).
76. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137 (emphasis added).
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sured imposing liability.' The court concluded by stating that "to sanc-
tion such a transaction 'would be to invite collusion between the claim-
ants and the insured' by allowing them to 'boot-strap [] their damages
with the ingenious assistance of counsel.'"'
In McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Insurance Co.', the California
Court of Appeal rejected the decision in Smith, finding the Smith rule
too rigid in light of the countervailing policy concerns recognized in
Critz v. Farmers Insurance Group' in favor of settlement and equaliza-
tion of insured's and insurer's strategic advantages. The McLaughlin
court held that a covenant not to execute is not fatal to the validity of a
stipulated judgment; rather, each case must be evaluated to determine
whether the problems of collusion and prejudice have been eliminated."'
In applying this determination to the facts of the case, the McLaughlin
court found that the problems of collusion were eliminated and that the
stipulated judgment satisfied the policy concerns requiring a conclusive
judicial determination of liability of the insured based upon the following
factors:' (1) although the parties stipulated to the insureds' liability,
they did not stipulate to damages;' (2) the stipulated judgments were
entered into after the court denied the insureds' summary judgment mo-
tions;' (3) although the stipulated judgments included a convenant not
to execute, which eliminated personal financial exposure for the judg-
77. Id. at 137-38. But see Sunseri v. Camperos Del Valle Stables, Inc., 230 Cal.
Rptr. 23 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding an insurer liable based on the principle that a stip-
ulated judgment will not be set aside unless reached through fraud or collusion).
78. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 138 (quoting Doser v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 162
Cal. Rptr. 115, 120-21 (Ct. App. 1980)).
79. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 571 (Ct. App. 1994).
80. 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (Ct App. 1964); see also supra note 10 and accompanying
text.
81. McLaughlin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572.
82. Before a third party plaintiff can bring a bad faith action against an insurer,
there must furst be a conclusive judicial determination of liability against the insured.
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal. 1988).
83. McLaughlin, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572. In McLaughlin, numerous investors sued
the officers and directors of a financial services company. Id. at 565. The coordina-
tion judge set seven actions brought by 13 investors as a "test case" for trial. Id. In
the test case, the jury awarded the investors approximately $4,250,000 in economic
damages, $300,000 for emotional distress and $147,000,000 in punitive damges. Id. The
subsequent stipulated judgment between the investors and the insureds was based
upon the jury award in the test case. Id.
After judgments were obtained in favor of the investors in the underlying ac-
tions, groups of investors brought a bad faith action against the company's insurer,
which insured the company under a directors and officers liability policy (D & 0
policy) and a comprehensive general liability policy (CGL policy). Id.
84. Id at 572. The court recognized that although denial of the insureds' summary
judgment did not indicate that the insureds were necessarily liable, it did indicate
that there were at least triable issues of fact as to the insureds' liability. Id.
1026
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ments, personal judgments against the insureds still existed which could
have adversely affected their future credit and business transactions;8
(4) the insurer was aware of the underlying litigation and knew that the
insureds might stipulate to liability;' and (5) the insurer encouraged the
insureds to enter a stipulation of liability with protective covenants, and,
therefore, was estopped from attacking the validity of the judgments.'
Even though the McLaugldin court held that the stipulated judgment
was a conclusive judicial determination of liability, the court rejected the
amount of the stipulated judgment as the proper amount of damages in a
bad faith action.' Thus, even though a stipulated judgment may, in
some cases, satisfy the prerequisite of a court determination of liability
against the insured, it does not necessarily represent the amount of dam-
ages that the plaintiff is entitled to recover.'
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. One of the insurer's executives testified in deposition:
I believe National Union was encouraging the directors and officers to enter
into stipulated judgments in or about March 1988 so that the directors and
officers wouldn't be compelled to go to trial. I think National Union was
also ... advising defense counsel of the insureds to insulate their clients
from potential personal asset exposure by getting a non-recourse type of
provision as part of the stipulated settlement with the plaintiffs. The thought
being that once the stipulated settlement was entered into that the plaintiffs
would have to submit their claim to the bankruptcy court and stand in line
as an insured creditor against the policy limits which were the-which had
been inter-pleaded by National Union in bankruptcy court.
Id. at 572. The executive was then asked: "So is it correct then that you were aware
that certain of the outside directors were planning to enter into stiplated judgments
with the plaintiffs before it actual occurred?" Answer. "I would take it one step fur-
ther. I think we were encouraging stipulated judgments . . . ." Id.
88. Id. at 574. The court held that the plaintiffs could seek recovery for all dam-
ages proximately caused by the insurer's bad faith conduct, except for punitive and
emotional distress damages. Id, Because the stipulated judgment did not reflect the
damages proximately caused by the insurer's bad faith conduct, it could not be used
as a proper measure of damages. Id. The plaintiffs had previously received the insur-
ance policy benefits, and the extent of damages suffered by the plaintiffs as a result
of the insurer's bad faith conduct was undetermined. Id.
89. Id.
1027
C. Good Faith Confirmation of a Stipulated Judgment May Not be
Sufficient to Satisfy the "Reasonable and Non-Collusive"
Requirement
In Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. National American Insur-
ance Co.,'" the insured entered into a stipulated judgment with the plain-
tiffs and moved for an order confirming that a good faith settlement was
entered into pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
877.6." The trial court found that the parties had, in fact, entered into
the settlement in good faith and without collusion.' As such, it con-
firmed the settlement pursuant to section 877.6.' Based upon the good
faith determination of the trial court, the fact that the insurer failed to
object to the settlement at the good faith hearing, and the insurer's fail-
ure to petition for a writ of mandate, the appellate court concluded that
the insurer was bound by the stipulated judgment.'
The court explained that the insurer must present its objections to the
settlement at the good faith confirmation hearing.' The court added
that an excess insurer may stand in the position of a "co-obligor," barred
from making a claim of bad faith or collusion against the settling parties
if the trial court finds that the settlement was made in good faith.' Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that the excess insurer's claims of bad
faith and collusion were barred as a matter of law under both section
877.6 and the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel.'
More recently, in Pacific Estates v. Superior Court,' the court ex-
pressly declined to follow Diamond Heights.' The second district ap-
pellate court rejected the reasoning in Diamond Heights, holding that a
non-participating insurer is not conclusively bound by a good faith deter-
mination under section 877.6.'" As such, an insurer is not barred from
asserting the defense of collusion.''
The court agreed with the contention that a trial court's good faith
finding "should have some evidentiary value in a later action."'" Howev-
er, the court noted that a good faith settlement would, at most, be con-
90. 227 Cal. Rptr. 906 (Ct. App. 1991).
91. Id. at 909.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 917 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(e) (West 1993)).
95. Id. at 917.
96. Id. (citing CAL CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c)(West 1993)).
97. Id. at 917.
98. 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434 (Ct. App. 1993).
99. Id. at 442.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 442-43.
102. Id. at 443.
1028
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sidered "presumptive evidence of liability and the amount of damages in
a later action against an insurer who wrongfully withheld indemnity or a
defense.. .. " In this regard, the Pacific Estates court attached very
little substantive weight to the good faith hearing in determining the
insurer's liability."l As the Pacific Estates court specifically acknowl-
edged, the evidentiary value of the good faith hearing in subsequent liti-
gation it may be advantageous for a plaintiff to secure a ruling under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.
Comparing Diamond Heights and Pacific Estates, it is clear that the
latter is the better reasoned case in applying the good faith settlement
hearing process to non-participating insurers. Although California Code
of Civil Procedure section 877.6(c) prohibits the release of a non-settling
co-obligor, the prohibition is limited to co-obligors on a contract debt."
Although an insurer is a co-obligor on the judgment against the in-
sured," it is neither a joint tortfeasor nor a co-obligor on a contract
debt. Therefore, the Pacific Estates case may carry substantial persua-
sive impact irrespective of the trial venue.
The Diamond Heights decision, compelling insurers to raise a collu-
sion defense in a good faith settlement hearing, is not unfair when an
insurer has wrongfully refused to defend its insured. Indeed, a California
appellate court could require such an insurer to litigate its collusion
defense simply as a matter of decisional law.
D. The "No Action" or 'Actual Trial" Clause as a Defense to
Enforcement of Stipulated Judgments
Insurers can assert various affirmative defenses with respect to the
enforcement of a settlement agreement entered into without the consent
of the insurance carrier. One of the more common defenses is that such
enforcement is barred by the "no action" clause of the insurance policy.
Where there is no evidence of breach by the insurer, a "no action" clause
precludes an action to recover settlement amounts which the insured
paid to the claimant without the insurer's consent. 7 The rationale be-
103. Id. at 444.
104. Id.; see also Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 726, 749 (Ct. App. 1993) (acknowledging the presumption that settlement
indicates liability as a tool for determining damages).
105. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a)(1) (West 1993).
106. See CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1993).
107. A typical "no action" clause provides: "'No action shall lie against the compa-
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hind this rule is that the insurer is only contractually obligated to indem-
nify the insured for legal liabilities. Such liabilities must be established
by either an action in which the insurer had the opportunity to defend or
by a settlement in which the insurer participated. "[Aibsent a demonstra-
tion of bad faith, a liability insurer acts within its contract rights whenev-
er it refuses to voluntarily settle a claim and insists there be an adjudica-
tion of the matter on its merits." "
In Rose v. Royal Insurance Co. of America,'" an insurer successfully
employed a "no action" clause to bar enforcement of a stipulated
judgment.110 The court found that a settlement agreement, following a
trial judgment for the tort claimant, did not satisfy the policy's "actual
trial" requirement."'
In the underlying action, the plaintiffs were awarded a judgment in the
amount of $1,058,800."' The judge, however, suggested that the parties
consider entering into a stipulated or consent judgment."' The parties
did so and allocated $30,000 as the damages incurred as a result of the
insured's willful and intentional wrongdoing and $1,058,800 as the
amount of damages stemming from the insured's negligent conduct."4
The plaintiffs attempted to enforce the consent judgment against the
defendant's insurer."' The insurer, however, denied coverage claiming
that the insurance policy's "no action" clause barred the action."' The
insurer claimed that the policy required that the liability of the insurer be
established by either (1) "a judgment against the insured after actual
trial" or (2) a "written agreement of the insured, the claimant, and the
[insurer].""7
On appeal, the court held that the policy's "actual trial" requirement
had not been satisfied because the parties had entered into a consent
judgment."8 The court stated that a consent judgment is "merely a con-
tract of the parties and entered by the court exercising an administrative
ny . .. until the amount of the insured's obligation has been finally determined either
by judgment against the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the in-
sured, the claimant and the company.'" Clarke v. Bellefonte Ins. Co., 169 Cal. Rptr.
832, 837 (Ct. App. 1980) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 838 (quoting Willet's Plumbing Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 548
S.W.2d 830, 831 (Ark. 1977)).
109. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Ct. App. 1991).
110. Id. at 487-88.
111. Id. at 486.
112. Id. at 484.
113. Id. At the judge's suggestion, the parties renewed settlement negotiations. Ild.
114. Id. at 486.
115. Id. at 485.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 486.
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function in simply recording what has been agreed upon.""' On that
basis, despite the fact that an actual trial was held before the parties
entered into the stipulated judgment, the court concluded that there was
no "actual trial", and therefore, ruled in favor of the insurer."'
Apparently, the fact that the stipulated judgment attributed only a
small portion of the plaintiff's damages to the insured's intentional and
willful conduct influenced the court.'"' Under the consent judgment, the
insurer was obligated to pay the majority of the damages."n The court's
strict application of the "actual trial" requirement thereby prevented the
perceived collusion between the insured and the tort claimant."
The court further supported its ruling with the observation that the
insurer had not provided its consent in writing." The court allowed
the insurer to deny its consent even though it provided the insured's
attorney who consented at the settlement.'2
E. An Insurer's Participation in Settlement Negotiations May Create
Collateral Estoppel and/or Res Judicata Effects
In determining whether to enforce a stipulated judgment against an
insurer, the courts may consider the insurer's participation in settlement
negotiations and the insurer's opportunity to defend the insured in the
underlying litigation.2 ' On that basis, an insurer that has ample oppor-
119. Id. (citing Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App. (1955)).
120. Id. at 488.
121. Id. at 486.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court stated: "a judgment against the insured after actual trial elimi-
nates the possibility of collusion since it "imposes the requirement of an actual con-
test of issues and does not include a judgment entered by the court after the approv-
al of a compromise settlement agreement by the insured and the injured party." Id.
(quoting 12A GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, § 45.866 (2d ed. 1981)
(citations omitted)).
124. Id. at 487.
125. Id. The court determined that the requirement that a judgment be "after actual
trial" is more restrictive than California Insurance Code § 11580, which specifies only
that a judgment be "secured" against the insured. Id. at 485-86. The court found that
the purpose of § 11580 was to protect claimants against insolvency of the insured
and to permit a post-judgment resort to the policy even though the insured is in
bankruptcy. Id.; see CA INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1993).
126. See generaily Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct App. 1993) (explaining that a stipulated judgment has no signifi-
cance to an insurer who has not signed the agreement); Studley v. Benicia Unified
Sch. Dist., 281 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct App. 1991) (holding that an insurer is not bound
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tunity to defend its insured and participates in settlement negotiations
will probably be bound by the terms of a resulting settlement
agreement.'27
In California State Automobile Ass'n Inter-Insurance Bureau v. Supe-
rior Court," the court ruled that a stipulated judgment which was
signed by the insurer, the insured, and the plaintiff constituted a final
and conclusive "judicial determination" of the underlying action." How-
ever, the cowrt stressed that its holding was to be narrowly con-
strued."n The court noted that the insurer "participated in the settle-
ment negotiations and signed the stipulation."'3 ' The court recognized
that the stipulated judgment would only have been presumptive evidence
of the insured's liability if either "the insurer had not received reasonable
notice of the settlement" or the insured was "not allowed to control the
insured's defense .... 32
The court further held that the stipulated judgment in question, as
compared to a "simple settlement agreement," constituted an enforceable
final determination of liability." In distinguishing between stipulated
judgments and settlement agreements, the court stated that a stipulated
judgment is based upon a judicial act which "a court has discretion to
perform."'" The court added that "a stipulated judgment may properly
be given collateral estoppel effect.., when the parties manifest an in-
tent to be collaterally bound by its terms."'35 On that basis, the court
concluded that because the insurer had signed the stipulation, it was col-
laterally estopped from relitigating liability."'
by a stipulated judgement to which it did not consent and to which it specifically de-
nied consenting); California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Superior Court, 788
P.2d 1156 (Cal. 1990) (holding that a stipulated judgment is a final judicial determina-
tion if it is signed by the insured, insurer, and claimant).
127. See California State Auto., 788 P.2d at 1156.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1157.
130. Id. at 1160 n.5 (stating that the holding is a narrow one).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1160.
134. Id. at 1159; see also CAL CIv. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994).
Section 664.6 states that "[if parties to pending litigation stipulate . . . for settlement
of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to
the terms of the settlement." Id.
135. California State Auto., 788 P.2d at 1160.
136. Id.; see also CAL CIV. CODE § 2778(6) (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (stating that
if "the person indemnifying . . . has no reasonable notice of the action or proceeding
against the person indemnified, or is not allowed to control its defense, judgment
against the latter is only presumptive evidence against the former"); 14 CAL JUR. 3D
Contribution and Indemnification §§ 70-71 (1974 & Supp. 1994) (stating that judg-
ment against indemnitee will be conclusive whether or not she appeared unless the
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When the insurer does not participate in the stipulated judgment, the
insurer will often not be bound by its terms. This principle is exemplified
in Studley v. Benicia Unified School District,"7 where the court held
that an insurer that is neither in breach of its duty to defend, nor a party
to the settlement negotiations, is not bound by a stipulated judgment
entered into with respect to the claimant and the insured.'" In Studley,
the insured's son shot a schoolmate and the insured sought insurance
coverage under his homeowners policy." The insurer denied coverage
on the grounds that the policy did not provide coverage for the incident
in question.'" Subsequently, the plaintiff and the insured entered a stip-
ulated judgment by which the insured assigned his rights against the
insurer to the plaintiff.'4'
The court found that the policy's willful conduct exclusion disallowed
coverage." The court further held that the plaintiff could not enforce
the stipulated judgment against the insurer because the judgment did not
include the insurer, and therefore, the insurer was not collaterally es-
topped from raising defenses against the enforcement of the judg-
ment.'"
More recently, in Xebec Development Partners, Ltd. v. National Union
Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,' the court again held that an in-
surer who does not participate in a stipulated judgment may not be
bound by its terms."5 In Xebec, several different parties sued the in-
indemnitor did not have reasonable notice, in which case the judgment has only the
effect of being presumptive evidence).
137. 281 Cal. Rptr. 631 (Ct. App. 1991).
138. Id. at 634.
139. Id. at 632.
140. Id. at 633.
141. Id. at 634. In consideration of the assignment of rights, plaintiff agreed not to
execute upon the judgment against the insured. Id.
142. Id. at 634.
143. Id.; see also Pacific Estates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434 (Ct.
App. 1993). In Pacific Estates, the court ruled that "non-participating insurers are not
conclusively bound by a stipulated judgment by principles of res judicata or collateral
estoppel" or as "co-obligers" under California Code of Civil Procedure § 877.6. Id. at
444; see CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West 1993).
144. 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726 (Ct. App. 1993).
145. Id. at 749 (stating "[w]here insurer did not join in the stipulation, a judgment
based on the stipulation may be entitled to presumptive weight but should bind the
insurer only to the extent it represents a true and independent adjudication of the
insured's liability").
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sured for allegedly diverting research funds to unauthorized uses. The
insured notified its insurance carrier of some of the lawsuits that repre-
sented a "potential occurrence" under its Director and Officers Insurance
Policy (D & 0 Policy). "7 The insurance carrier refused to participate in
the arbitration proceedings and settlement negotiations on the ground
that it was substantially prejudiced because it had only received notice of
the lawsuit four days prior to the scheduled arbitration."M
During arbitration proceedings, the insured entered into a settlement
agreement with the plaintiffs in the amount of $9,833,479, plus costs and
attorney's fees.4 ' The court subsequently entered this settlement agree-
ment as a final stipulated judgment."6 The stipulated judgment included
a covenant not to execute against the insured that provided in pertinent
part: [plaintiffs] "will not at any time levy execution on or otherwise seek
to enforce the Final Judgment" as against [the insureds] but that the
covenant "shall not limit enforcement of the Final Judgment or any claim
or right against any person or entity other than" [the insureds] "including
without limitation [their] insurers." 5'
An "award of arbitrators" was attached to the settlement agreement in
accordance with the parties' stipulation.52 Two days later, the superior
court entered an order, "confirming and adopting the award 'as the final
judgment in the action. '" "
Following entry of the stipulated judgment, the plaintiffs demanded
payment from the insurer pursuant to the terms of the agreement.' 4
The insurer did not respond, and the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging (1)
breach of the insurance contract and (2) breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing."
146. Id. at 731.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 734-35. The attorney for the insurance carrier wrote to the insured:
Due to the complete failure of Xebec and its directors and officers [the
insureds] to provide National Union with any information regarding this
claim, which conduct constitutes breaches of [enumerated provisions] of the
policy, National Union hereby disclaims any responsibility for the costs of
defense and/or indemnity which may be asserted by Xebec and/or Messrs.
Toreson and Hoebich under National Union's policy in connection with the
claims asserted by XDP against Xebec, its subsidiaries and Messrs. Toreson
and Hoebich.
Id, at 734 (second alteration in original)(quoting Kristiansen's letter to National Union).
149. Id. at 735.
150. Id.
151. Id
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. A third cause of action was alleged for breach of subdivision (h) of Insur-
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A jury trial against the insurer resulted in a general verdict for the
plaintiffs and against the insurer in the amount of $7,375,000."s Specifi-
cally, the jury found that the insureds had acted unreasonably towards
the insurer by providing late notice and that the insurer had acted unrea-
sonably toward the insureds in its handling of the claim after it received
notice.'57 In so finding, the jury determined the comparative percentages
of unreasonable conduct were 25 percent attributable to the insureds and
75 percent attributable to the insurer."
On appeal, the court considered various issues including the effect of
the stipulated judgment in determining the rights, liabilities and amount
of damages in a subsequent lawsuit against the insurer." The appellate
court confirmed the jury finding that the insurer was in breach of its
duties under the insurance policy.'
The insurer argued that its obligation to indemnify its insureds would
arise "only after they had paid the amount of liability asserted against
them" and that since the "covenant not to execute [in the stipulated judg-
ment] removed any compulsion upon [the insureds] to pay the asserted
liability, [the insurer] did not have a duty to indemnify [the insureds].1 6'
The court of appeal rejected the insurer's contention and stated that
even if the policy required indemnity only after the insured has paid the
liability, the covenant not to execute would not "ipso facto release" the
insurer from any indemnification obligation under the policy."
The plaintiffs asserted that the policy entitled them to recover from
the insurer the full amount of damages pursuant to the stipulated judg-
ment." The court of appeal set forth the general rule that "the insurer
that wrongfully refused to defend will be liable to the insured in the
amount of the judgment against him or her, plus his or costs of de-
fense.""u However, in Xebec, the D & 0 insurance policy did not impose
ance Code § 790.03. Id. However, in the course of trial "the superior court granted
[the insurer'si motion for judgment on the pleadings as to ... Insurance Code
§ 790.03 theories." Id. at 736; see CAL INS. CODE § 790.03 (West 1993).
156. Xebec, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 737. The court noted that this amount was almost ex-
actly 75% of the amount fixed in the stipulated judgment. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 736.
159. Id. at 737-42.
160. Id. at 742.
161. Id. at 733-34.
162. Id. at 744.
163. Id at 745.
164. Id. (citing Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 169 (Cal. 1966); Arenson v.
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on the insurer a duty to defend; rather, it only imposed a duty to pay for
the insureds' defense.'" More importantly, the court emphasized that
the stipulated judgment was not the result of contested proceedings and
therefore, "none of the assurances of validity implicit in judicial proceed-
ings openly contested to final judgment, or even in contested arbitration
proceedings, were furihed ... ." As a result, the court of appeal re-
fused to apply the general rule "applicable to contested judgments.""7
Plaintiffs further claimed that the stipulated judgment bound the insur-
er because the insurer had received a sufficient opportunity to object to
the stipulated judgment as collusive.'" As a result, plaintiffs argued the
insurer "should have been precluded as a matter of collateral estoppel
from contesting the amount of the stipulated judgment."'"T he insurer
asserted that it could not have intervened or objected to the stipulated
judgment because intervening would have conflicted with the interests of
the insured. ' ° Rather, the insurer chose to litigate in a separate pro-
ceeding its assertion against the enforcement of the stipulated judg-
ment.'' The court of appeal held that the insurer was entitled to chal-
lenge the enforcement of the stipulated judgment in a separate proceed-
ing and was not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel."7
Next, the court addressed whether the stipulated judgment represented
a proper measure of damages against the insurer for breach of the insur-
ance contract. The court stated that when an insurer joins a stipulation,
"it may be properly bound by the figure to which it stipulated."
7
Where, however, the insurer does not join the stipulation, the judgment
amount "may be entitled to presumptive weight as the proper measure of
damages, but should bind the insurer only to the extent it represents a
true independent adjudication of the insured's liability."'
National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 P.2d 816, 819 (Cal. 1955)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 746.
168. Id. at 747. Plaintiffs contended that the insurer could have raised such objec-
tions during the arbitration proceedings, or at the confirmation hearing in superior
court, and had six months to move to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure § 473, but failed to do so. Id. at 746.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 747.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 749.
174. Id.
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F. The Insured Cannot Enforce a Stipulated Judgment by Seeking
Reimbursement From its Insurer Prior to a Final Determination of
Liability
In Isaacson v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n, 76 the court
held that an insured may seek reimbursement from its insurer when the
insured pays all or part of a settlement and enters into a reasonable
stipulated judgment in good faith, even if the settlement is in excess of
the insurance policy limits.'78 The fact that the insured paid part of the
settlement, however, does not bind the insurer to reimburse the amount
paid. 1
In Isaacson, the plaintiffs sued the insureds for medical malprac-
tice. The insureds settled the claim and entered into a stipulated judg-
ment for $500,000.T The insurer offered a maximum of $400,000 to set-
tle the case." The insureds, fearing additional liability if the case pro-
ceeded to trial, paid the additional $100,000 to the plaintiffs.'' Thereaf-
ter, the insureds filed suit against their insurer for reimbursement of the
$100,000 and for further damages based on several tort theories."
The California Supreme Court held that the insurer could be held lia-
ble for reimbursement of the $100,000 if the insurer breached its statuto-
ry duty" to pay and discharge "covered claims." The court stated
that if an insured either pays an adverse judgment or contributes a rea-
sonable amount in settlement of a claim, the insured has a cause of ac-
tion against its insurer for reimbursement. In order to recover reim-
bursement from an insurer, the insured must prove only that the insurer
breached its duty to accept a reasonable settlement offer." In order to
175. 750 P.2d 297 (Cal. 1988).
176. Id. at 308.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 300.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 302. Following the stipulated judgment, the insurer paid a total of
$400,000. Id
181. Id.
182. Id. The insureds based their claims on the Guarantee Act, the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
183. See generaly CAL INS. CODE § 1063.2(a) (West 1993) (requiring CIGA to pay
and discharge covered claims in accordance with the policy provisions).
184. Isaacson, 750 P.2d at 308. "Covered claims" are defined as "the obligations of
an insolvent insurer . . . ." CAL. INS. CODE § 1063.I(c) (West 1993).
185. Isaacson, 750 P.2d at 309.
186. Id.
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establish damages, the insured need not prove actual liability for the
underlying claim.'7 After establishing breach, the insured can establish
damages based on the amount of the settlement."
In addressing the facts of the case, the court concluded that the in-
sured did not offer sufficient evidence that the insurer breached its duty
to accept a reasonable settlement offer, and therefore, the insurer was
not required to reimburse the insureds.'" The court noted the present
case was distinguishable from those cases in which an insurer either. (1)
denies coverage entirely; or (2) wrongfully refuses to defend the in-
sured.'" In those cases, the insured is entitled to a presumption that
the amount of the settlement is equivalent to the reasonable value of the
claim.
191
It is critical to note that Isaacson was decided in the context of a
stipulated judgment entered into between the claimant and the insured.
The results are significantly different when an insurer refuses to accept
the claimant's settlement offer and the case proceeds to trial. If a judg-
ment is entered against the insured in an amount in excess of the
insurer's maximum settlement offer, the excess of the resulting judgment
over the claimant's settlement offer is presumptive evidence of the dam-
age award for breach of the insurer's implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.'" In that instance, the amount of damages determined by a
trier of fact is assumed to be reasonable." Likewise, when an insurer
wrongfully refuses to defend a claim, and the insured settles, the amount
of the settlement is presumptive evidence of the plaintiffs damages be-
cause the insured is bargaining with his or her own money.'" In
Isaacson, however, there was no contested trial, and the insured could
not prove that the insurer breached its duties.'" Therefore, the settle-
ment amount was not presumptive evidence of the amount of damag-
es. 19
In Finkelstein v. 20th Century Insurance Co., 7 the court held that
an insured's bad faith action against an insurer is premature if brought
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 310.
190. Id. at 309-10.
191. Id.
192. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 177 (Cal. 1967), for a discussion
of these propositions.
193. Id. at 192.
194. Id.
195, Isaacson, 750 P.2d at 310.
196. Id.
197. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305 (Ct. App. 1992).
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prior to a judgment being rendered against the insured." In the under-
lying action, the claimant was involved in an automobile accident."
The insured's policy had a maximum coverage of $100,000 per injured
party.'e The case was eventually settled for $85,000, of which the in-
sured personally paid $6700."3 Subsequently, the insured brought a
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing action against
the insurer.'
The court ruled that the "mere possibility" that a jury verdict could
have exceeded the insured's policy limits was insufficient grounds to
bring a cause of action.' The court concluded that "[slince there was
no judgment in excess of the policy limits, [the insured's] cause of action
never matured. " '4
The Isaacson' and Finkelstein' decisions illustrate that an in-
sured, who decides personally to pay a portion of a settlement prior to a
final judicial determination of liability, does so at his or her own risk. In
these situations, an insured will not be reimbursed unless the insurer
either refuses to accept a reasonable settlement offer, or a final judgment
has been entered against the insured.
IV. WHERE THE INSURER IS IN BREACH OF ITS DUTY TO DEFEND OR
SETTLE A CLAIM, A STIPULATED JUDGMENT
MAY BE ENFORCED
As a general rule, an insurer is obligated to pay the full amount of a
judgment against its insured, including any amounts in excess of the
insured's policy limits, when the insurer refuses to accept a reasonable
198. Id. at 306-07.
199. Id. at 306. The insured was later convicted of felony for driving while under
the influence. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 307 (citing Doser v. Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. Rptr. 115 (Ct.
App. 1980)). In Doser, the court ruled that the plaintiff had no claim for breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because no judgment had been en-
tered against the insured in the underlying wrongful death action. Doser, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 121.
204. Finkelstein, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
205. Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Assoc., 750 P.2d 297 (Cal. 1988) (holding
that because plaintiff doctors did not establish that the insurer breached its duty to
settle for a reasonable amount, plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery).
206. Finkelstein, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 305.
1039
settlement offer within the policy limits." 7 This general rule holds true
irrespective of whether the insurer assumes a duty to defend the insured.
Under the terms of a typical insurance policy, the insured has the right
to reach a reasonable settlement with a claimant; however, the settle-
ment amount is usually subject to the insurer's consent. Nonetheless,
courts have permitted an insured to settle without such consent when
the insurer has, in some way, repudiated or breached its duties under the
policy. As with any contractual relationship, once the insurer refutes or
materially breaches the insurance contract, the insurer cannot enforce
the policy terms, including the consent requirement.'
These principles were addressed in Diamond Heights Homeowners
Ass'n v. National American Insurance Co.' In Diamond Heights, the
plaintiff, seeking damages for construction defects, sued the insured.2"'
Ultimately, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which provid-
ed for a stipulated judgment in the amount of $2,671,000.2' Various in-
surers denied coverage, and therefore, did not participate in the settle-
ment."2 The insured moved to confirm the settlement pursuant to Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6."' The trial court con-
firmed the settlement, stating that it had been entered into in good faith
and without collusion.2"4 In addition, the trial court found that the in-
sured was clearly liable to the plaintiff.2"5 Subsequently, the plaintiff
initiated an action against the non-contributing insurers to satisfy the bal-
ance of the stipulated judgment.2 0 One of the excess insurers sought
summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) its policy excluded cov-
erage; (2) the stipulated judgment was entered into without its consent;
(3) the settlement violated the policy's "no action" clause; and (4) the
settlement appeared to be the result of collusion.""
In addressing this carrier's contentions, the court noted that the prima-
ry insurers had provided a defense in the underlying action."8 Further,
207. See Johansen v. California State Auto. Ass'n. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 538 P.2d 744
(Cal. 1975) (holding insured liable for entire judgment when it failed to accept set-
tlement offer within policy limits).
208. See Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. National Am. Ins. Co., 277 Cal.
Rptr. 906 (Ct. App. 1991).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 909.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 912.
216. Id. at 909.
217. Id. at 913.
218. Id. at 909-10. The court granted summary judgment to the primary insurer
based on the "work product" exclusion contained in the policy. Id.
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the court observed that the excess insurer failed to join in the defense or
the settlement despite the fact that it knew of the action and the settle-
ment negotiations." The excess insurer took the position that no duty
to defend existed even though it had received notice that the plaintiffs
demand exceeded primary coverage limits.' The excess insurer only
responded by retaining counsel to monitor the case."
The appellate court held that a primary insurer may negotiate a good
faith settlement in an amount which invades excess coverage when both
the insured's liability is established and the excess insurer is in breach of
its duties.' In addition, the court concluded that a primary insurer may
enter a settlement agreement and bind the excess insurer without the
excess insurer's approval.' The court further found that an insurer can
relinquish its power under the "no action" clause if it refuses a fair set-
tlement and declines to participate in the defense.'
This same principle was upheld in Consolidated American Insurance
Co. v. Mike Soper Marine Services," where the court reaffirmed the
rule that an insurer may be bound to a stipulated judgment, even in an
amount in excess of its policy, if it is in breach of its duties." In Con-
solidated, the plaintiff filed suit against the insured. The insurer as-
sumed the defense, but it did not reserve the power to raise the issue of
219. Id. at 911.
220. Id. at 912.
221. Id. In May 1987, the primary carriers informed the excess insurer that the
primary policy limits would probably be exhausted. Id. In June 1987, the excess in-
surer asked for all discovery documents. Id. In November 1987, two of the primary
carriers advised the excess insurer that their policy limits had been reached. Id,
222. Id. at 913-16.
223. Id. at 915. The court's rationale was based upon its interpretation of the pri-
mary insurer's policies. Id. Thus, the primary carriers were obligated to provide a
defense without any right to demand that the excess carrier participate in it before
settlement or judgment. Id.
224. Id. at 916; see Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Ins. Co., 367 A.2d 864 (N.J.
1976). In Fireman's Fund, the court held that an excess insurer is in breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing unless he makes a reasonable effort to obtain
a fair settlement. Id. at 868-70. The court further ruled that the insured was free to
mitigate its liability by settling the claim, even though the policy contained a "no ac-
tion" clause. Id. at 869. Further, the insured may "then recover the settlement amount
from the insurer." Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the insurer loses
the right to approve settlements when it breaches its contractual duty to the insured.
Id. at 868.
225. 951 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1991).
226. Id. at 189-91.
227. Id. at 187.
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the policy's coverage.' Subsequently, the insurer decided not to defend
the insured, maintaining that the claim fell within the policy's "watercraft
exclusion."' The insured incurred liability for $1,000,000 pursuant to a
stipulated default judgment.' The insured then assigned his claim
against the insurer to the plaintiff. 1 The plaintiff sued the insurer for
bad faith and breach of its duty to the insured to settle the claim in ac-
cordance with the policy.' The lower court awarded the plaintiff sum-
mary judgment for the full amount of the settlement and post-judgment
interest.23
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that if an insurance carrier
fails to agree to a fair settlement within its policy limits, it assumes the
risk of liability for damages caused by its breach.' Thus, the carrier
may be subject to damages that exceed the insured's coverage.2m The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment against the carrier for $1,000,000
plus post-judgment interest.'
In Sanchez v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 7 the plaintiff brought a
lawsuit against her employer for sexual harassment alleging wrongful
constructive discharge, assault and battery, and negligent supervision by
the employer.' The employer "tendered defense of the lawsuit to their
insurer... but [the insurer] refused to defend or to be involved in any
way." =
Before trial, "the parties entered into a proposed settlement which they
presented to the court for approval."' The court found that the terms
of the proposed settlement met the criteria of a good faith settlement as
articulated in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates.'
228. Id.
229. Id. at 188.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 187.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 190.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 191.
237. 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 812 (Ct. App. 1994).
238. Id. at 814.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 814-15 (citing Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 698 P.2d 159
(Cal. 1985)). Among the factors articulated in Tech-Bilt for determining whether a
settlement is in good faith are: a rough approximation of the damages for which the
plaintiff is likely to recover, the amount of those damages attributable to the settling
defendant, the amount paid in settlement, the amount of insurance, and whether
there is any evidence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct between the plaintiff
and the settling defendant. Tech-Bilt, 698 P.2d at 166.
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The settlement agreement provided an award to the plaintiff in the
amount of $250,000.' The agreement further provided that Sanchez
"covenanted not to execute on the judgment against... [the employ-
er] ... until the direct action against the insurer was resolved."' "After
a reasonable time, if [the plaintiff] was unsuccessful against the insurer,
[Sanchez] could execute against the employer for no more than
$25,000."4
Sanchez then filed a direct action against the insurer seeking to en-
force the judgment.' The insurer filed a demurrer "on the ground that
the 'no action' clause in the policy precluded Sanchez's action because
the judgment she obtained was not after 'actual trial' or by 'written
agreement' of the insurer."24 The court granted the insurer's demurrer,
and plaintiff appealed. 7
On appeal, the Sixth Appellate District of the California Court of Ap-
peal, addressed "whether an insurer that refuses to defend its insured
can rely on the 'no action' clause in its policy to preclude an action un-
der section 11580."' The court found that where the insurance carrier
refused to defend its insured and where the stipulated judgment had
been entered in good faith, the insurer is bound to the settlement
amount regardless of the "no action" clause.u9
The court distinguished cases where a stipulated judgment was not
enforceable because the insured had not satisfied the "actual trial" or
"written agreement" of the insurer requirements by illustrating that in
Rose v. Royal Insurance Co.' and Wright v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Cos., I the insurers provided a defense to the insured.'s
242. Sanchez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Ct App. 1991) (insurer argued that "no action" clause pre-
cludes judgment creditor's action).
251. 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a stipulated judgment against
an insured, to which insurer did not consent, was insufficient to constitute a judg-
ment).
252. Sanchez, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815-16.
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V. HINTS TO THE PRACTITIONER-FASHIONING ENFORCEABLE
STIPULATED JUDGMENTS
In light of recent California case law, the parties to a stipulated judg-
ment should take into account the following suggestions to ensure that
the judgment will have a binding effect on insurers in subsequent litiga-
tion:
1. The settlement should be subject to a "good faith settlement" ruling
and the insurers should be given notice of the hearing. There is some
authority for the proposition that the good faith hearing is the insurer's
one and only opportunity to contest the stipulated judgment on the
grounds of unreasonableness or collusion.' Since the insurer will rare-
ly have an adequate opportunity to prepare for such a hearing, it would
be strategically favorable to ultimate enforcement of the settlement if liti-
gation of the unreasonableness and collusion defenses could be con-
tained within the good faith settlement proceeding. Be advised, however,
that some recent authority would permit the insurer to litigate the merits
of the entire underlying case in the follow-up enforcement action.'
2. Each policy should be inspected from the standpoint of whether it
contains an "actual trial" requirement in its "no action" clause. Insurers
whose policies contain such language have enhanced prospects for fend-
ing off enforcement actions.'m
3. The insured should consider a settlement under which it does not
receive an unqualified covenant not to execute upon the stipulated judg-
ment. The insured should retain some personal exposure to liability on
the judgment.
Another option may be to protect the insured in a different fashion.
For example, the insured may receive protection in the form of greatly
extended payment terms. To this might be added an absolute cut-off of
further liability on the judgment if the balance of the judgment has not
been satisfied by one or more insurance carriers after a certain date.
However, this latter form of protection might draw into question the ul-
timate enforceability of the judgment against the insurer, simply because
it is, arguably, a form of non-recourse agreement.
253. See Diamond Heights Homeowners Ass'n v. National Am. Ins. Co., 277 Cal.
Rptr. 906, 917 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the appropriate time for the insurer to
object is at the good faith confirmation hearing).
254. See Xebec Dev. Partners, Ltd. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
726 (Ct. App. 1993) (demonstrating that an insurer may litigate the merits of the
underlying case during a follow-up).
255. See Rose v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483 (Ct. App. 1991) (validat-
ing a policy provision which only permits an action against the insurer where a judg-
ment is entered against it "after actual trial").
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Despite all of these precautionary measures, in the present judicial
climate, there is no way to assure that a stipulated judgment with non-
recourse elements will ultimately be enforceable against a non-perform-
ing insurer. If, however, the parties are willing to take the risks and enter
some variant of this sort of settlement, they should set the stage by first
making timely "within-limits" settlement demands, so that upon rejection,
the insurers might be liable not only for the amount of a judgment within
their limits, but the portion in excess of their limits as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is uncertain as to whether a non-consenting insurer may be bound
by a stipulated judgment entered against the insured unless (1) the liabili-
ty of the insured has been conclusively established by judgment follow-
ing a contested proceeding; (2) coverage exists for the claim; (3) the
settlement was entered into in good faith; and (4) the settlement amount
is reasonable. However, an insurer may be liable for a stipulated judg-
ment, even in an amount in excess of its policy provisions where the
insurer either wrongfully refuses to defend, is in breach of its duty to
accept a reasonable settlement offer, or was a party to the settlement
agreement.
The courts' recent cautionary posture toward enforcement of stipulat-
ed judgments against insurers is based largely upon the perceived poten-
tial for collusion between the insured and the tort claimant. An as-
signment of rights, coupled with a covenant not to execute, presents
substantial risks of collusion due to the absence of true adversity, which
is perceived as an incentive to bargain for a low settlement amount.
Thus, recent case law illustrates a shift in favor of protecting an insurer
from enforcement of a stipulated judgment where there has been no
adjudication on the merits. In light of the Xebec, 56 Wright,"'
Smith,' and Rose' decisions, it appears that California courts are
strongly disinclined to enforce stipulated judgments against insurers
unless the liability of the insured has been contested on the merits and a
judgment is entered against the insured.
256. Xebec, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726; see supra notes 144-74 and accompanying text.
257. Wright v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 588 (Ct. App. 1992); see
supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
258. Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Ct. App. 1992);
see supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
259. Rose, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483; see supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
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